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FEDERAL INFLUENCES ON THE TREATMENT OF LAW AND
FACT IN TORT LITIGATION
ROBERT E. KEETON*
INTRODUCTION
Three themes appear in this Article, sometimes intermittently
and sometimes interwoven.
The first theme is about relationships between law and fact in tort
litigation. Economic, social, political, and interpersonal develop-
ments outside the legal system, as well as developments within, have a
significant effect on the nature of legal and factual issues in litigation.
As this evolution continues, its consequences for the entire commu-
nity of legal professionals, and for the larger community as well, are
increasing.
The second theme implicates the law of defamation. It concerns
the clash between protecting freedom of expression and protecting
reputations against the harm resulting from the publication of false-
hoods. Unsettled issues of law relevant to this theme are arising more
often now than before. What courts are doing in seeking an appropri-
ate accommodation between interests in reputation and in freedom of
expression illustrates dramatically the first theme-consequences of
changing concepts about relationships between legal and factual is-
sues are increasing in tort litigation generally, not merely in the law of
defamation.
The third theme is about who decides different kinds of issues
that may determine the outcome of litigation. It is about the alloca-
tion of responsibility between judges and juries. Are changes identi-
fied as illustrations of the first two themes also pointing to
modifications of conventional ways of defining and describing the dis-
tinction between issues that are to be decided as factual findings (by a
jury, or by the trial judge in a bench trial) and those to be decided as
matters of law are decided?
In this issue of the Maryland Law Review, we are paying deserved
tribute to Professor Oscar Gray. His scholarly works, as we shall see in
part V, contain significant insights that bear upon each of the three
themes of this Article.
* United States District Judge, District of Massachusetts. Langdell Professor Emeri-
tus, Harvard Law School.
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I. BROADER IMPLICATIONS OF A CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATION FOR
FREEDOM TO PUBLISH FALSEHOOD
The Supreme Court's decision in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan1
formulated a constitutional foundation for theories of protection
against liability; first, for publishing falsehood and, second, as has
later become evident, occasionally for other conduct. These develop-
ments have added a new edge of intellectual challenge to predicting
the future of tort law. It is now evident that Sullivan's rippling effects
on tort law generally, and not just the law of defamation, have ex-
ceeded most early predictions. Other developments, both federal and
state, and both legislative and precedential, have contributed to an
ongoing trend of federalizing significant segments of tort law.
A distinction between law and fact, if not inherent in any concept
of justice according to law, at the least can be observed in even the
earliest records of Anglo-American jurisprudence. From an early
date, this distinction has dominated thinking about the respective
roles of courts and juries injury trials, and the respective roles of trial
and appellate judges in all litigation. Even so, precise formulations of
the distinction are rarely attempted. The explanation for lack of
deeper probing may have been that the kind of general understand-
ing gleaned from the ordinary connotations of "law" and "fact" usually
is sufficient for the judge and jury to go about their respective tasks. A
more precise understanding may become essential to reasoned deci-
sion-making, however, in a small but growing percentage of tort litiga-
tion. This observation applies not only to federal law issues but also to
state law issues and to tort litigation more generally and wherever it
occurs. To keep the subject matter of this Article within manageable
bounds, however, I propose to discuss only federal law influences on
the law-fact distinction and the implications for tort litigation.
As we shall see in part V, Professor Gray's comments on the impli-
cations of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan foreshadowed the Supreme
Court's recurring expressions on the subject of "independent"judicial
determinations on mixed legal-factual issues of constitutional
significance.
II. "INDEPENDENT" DETERMINATIONS OF A REVIEWING COURT
A. "Closer Scrutiny" and "Independent" Determinations
One distinctive rule of law that New York Times Co. v. Sullivan in-
troduced is the proposition that the Supreme Court will indepen-
1. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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dently review constitutionally significant factual inferences to be
drawn from a trial record.2 Key factual inferences so reviewed in that
case concerned whether the constitutionally required "actual malice"
had been proved3 and whether the defamatory expressions were "of
and concerning" Sullivan.4
Precedent for some sort of independent review by the Supreme
Court of constitutionally significant inferences from historical facts,
though first made an explicit part of the law of defamation in Sullivan,
had developed earlier in litigation over asserted rights other than First
Amendment protections of expression. One example involved the ap-
plication of a standard of proof requiring, in a denaturalization pro-
ceeding, evidence that is "clear, unequivocal, and convincing."5 Both
the concept of independent review and the terminology associated
with it evolved as applications in varied contexts accumulated during
the twentieth century.6 Earlier opinions of the Court more often
spoke of "closer scrutiny" than of "independent" review.' With the
addition of frequent and varied illustrations not only within the law of
defamation, but also for example, in habeas corpus proceedings, the
evolution of precedents regarding the scope and limits of this more
rigorous review accelerated in the two decades after the 1964 decision
in Sullivan. Then, in 1984, the Court returned to this theme in decid-
ing Bose Cop. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc.8 By this time the
Court was ready to say that in certain areas the Court "exercise [s] its
own independent judgment"'9 about inferences to be drawn from a rec-
ord. One year later, in Miller v. Fenton,'° quoted below, the Court re-
ferred to a federal court's function in considering voluntariness of a
confession as one of "independent federal determination.""
This rule of independent determination, although first invoked
in defamation law in Sullivan,'2 had earlier beginnings,"3 and contin-
2. Id. at 285.
3. Id. at 286-87.
4. Id. at 288.
5. Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U.S. 665, 670-72 (1944); see also Schneiderman v.
United States, 320 U.S. 118, 125, 158 (1943).
6. See, e.g., the treatment of independent review in Justice O'Connor's opinion in
Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 105-18 (1985), discussed infra text accompanying notes 15-
17.
7. E.g., NLRB v. Walton Mfg. Co., 369 U.S. 404, 418 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissent-
ing) (stating that FED. K Civ. P. 52(a) "permits closer scrutiny" of trial judge's factual
findings).
8. 466 U.S. 485 (1984).
9. Id. at 501 n.17, 514 (emphasis added).
10. Miller, 474 U.S. at 112; see infra text accompanying note 17.
11. Miller, 474 U.S. at 112.
12. 376 U.S. 254, 285-92 (1964).
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ues to produce a growing body of illustrations in quite varied contexts.
One example, barely postdating Bose,14 is Miller,15 a case in which a
state prisoner presented constitutional challenges in a federal habeas
corpus proceeding seeking release under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.16 The
prisoner challenged the admissibility of a confession in a state crimi-
nal trial. Justice O'Connor, delivering the opinion of the Court, ex-
plained why the ultimate question of the admissibility of a confession
is a legal inquiry requiring plenary federal review.
The Court of Appeals recognized that treating the vol-
untariness of a confession as an issue of fact was difficult to
square with "fifty years of caselaw" in this Court. It believed,
however, that this substantial body of contrary precedent was
not controlling in light of our more recent decisions address-
ing the scope of the § 2254(d) presumption of correctness.
We acknowledge that the Court has not charted an entirely
clear course in this area. We reject, however, the Court of
Appeals' conclusion that these case-specific holdings tacitly
overturned the longstanding rule that the voluntariness of a
confession is a matter for independent federal
determination.
In the § 2254(d) context, as elsewhere, the appropriate
methodology for distinguishing questions of fact from ques-
tions of law has been, to say the least, elusive. A few princi-
ples, however, are by now well established. For example, that
an issue involves an inquiry into state of mind is not at all
inconsistent with treating it as a question of fact. Equally
clearly, an issue does not lose its factual character merely be-
cause its resolution is dispositive of the ultimate constitu-
tional question. But beyond these elemental propositions,
negative in form, the Court has yet to arrive at "a rule or
principle that will unerringly distinguish a factual finding
from a legal conclusion."
Perhaps much of the difficulty in this area stems from
the practical truth that the decision to label an issue a "ques-
tion of law," a "question of fact," or a "mixed question of law
and fact" is sometimes as much a matter of allocation as it is
13. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
14. 466 U.S. 485 (1984).
15. 474 U.S. at 104.
16. Section 2254 provides that "[i]n any proceeding instituted in a Federal court by an
application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of
a State court, a determination after a hearing on the merits of a factual issue, made by a
State court of competent jurisdiction ... shall be presumed to be correct .... " 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(d) (1994).
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of analysis. At least in those instances in which Congress has
not spoken and in which the issue falls somewhere between a
pristine legal standard and a simple historical fact, the fact/
law distinction at times has turned on a determination that,
as a matter of the sound administration of justice, one judi-
cial actor is better positioned than another to decide the is-
sue in question.
After defending at length its conclusion that the volun-
tariness of a confession was entitled to the § 2254(d) pre-
sumption, and after carefully analyzing the petitioner's
confession under that standard, the Court of Appeals sug-
gested in a brief footnote that it "would reach the same re-
suit" even were it to give the issue plenary consideration.
Inasmuch as it is not clear from this language that the court
did in fact independently evaluate the admissibility of the
confession, and because, in any event, we think that the case
warrants fuller analysis under the appropriate standard, we
reverse the decision below and remand for further proceed-
ings consistent with this opinion.17
Barely more than a decade later, in 1995, this formulation of the
concept was reasserted forcefully in an especially interesting context.
The case before the Court was U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton.'8 The
petitioners challenged an amendment to the Arkansas Constitution
that precluded persons who had served a specified number of terms
in the United States Congress from having their names placed on the
ballot for election to Congress. Justice Stevens delivered the opinion
of the Court, holding that (1) states are constitutionally forbidden to
impose qualifications for representatives or senators,'9 (2) the power
to set additional qualifications was not reserved to the states by the
Tenth Amendment,2" and (3) a state constitutional provision is sub-
ject to federal constitutional challenge when it has the likely effect of
handicapping a class of candidates and has the sole purpose of indi-
rectly creating additional qualifications. 2
The term limits controversy was a matter of great public interest.
So, too, was the Court's role in resolving the few aspects of the larger
controversy that were before the Court. Explaining his dissent from
the Court's resolution of one of those aspects of the larger term limits
17. Miller, 474 U.S. at 112-14, 118 (citations omitted).
18. 115 S. Ct. 1842 (1995).
19. Id. at 1845.
20. Id. at 1854.
21. Id. at 1871.
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controversy, Justice Thomas invoked precedents from the law of defa-
mation. Joined by ChiefJustice Rehnquist, Justice O'Connor, andJus-
tice Scalia,22 he stated: "In certain areas, indeed, this Court
apparently gives quite little deference to the initial factfinder, but
rather 'exercise [s] its own independent judgment' about the factual
conclusions that should be drawn from the record."28 One may rea-
sonably assert that the term limits case was more about federalism
than about Supreme Court review of the "factual conclusions" of the
Arkansas Supreme Court. Nevertheless, what the opinions in Thornton
say about the law-fact distinction is especially interesting. Justice
Thomas noted that, on this subject, a connection with Justice Ste-
vens's majority opinion in Bose appears in other contexts as well as that
of the term limits controversy. 24
One reason the dissenting opinion from Justice Thomas is espe-
cially interesting is that one may think of the Supreme Court's in-
dependent consideration of factual assertions as quite activist
compared to the Court's generally cautious approach to reviewing fac-
tual findings. Indeed, it is often stated, somewhat provocatively but
nevertheless seriously, that the Supreme Court's role is not to assure
thatjustice is done in a particular case. Performing that function typi-
cally requires consideration of fact-dependent issues. The Supreme
Court's primary role is to decide issues of law of more general signifi-
cance. After all, before a case ever reaches the Supreme Court it has
been through all of the processes of the lower courts aimed at assur-
ing an appropriate decision on the facts (as well as the law, of course)
after fair process. Yet, it was Justice Thomas, one of the strongest crit-
ics ofjudicial activism, who in 1995 wrote the dissent in Thornton, ex-
tolling the Supreme Court's role of "independent judgment" about
"factual conclusions" of potential constitutional significance. 25
The dissenting opinion of Justice Thomas brings a new focus on
footnote 17 in Bose, which may be destined to take a place in the cata-
log of oft-cited Supreme Court footnotes.26 Among the interesting
features of the footnote is that it is entirely textual, with no citations.
22. Id. at 1875 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
23. Id. at 1910 n.40 (citing Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466
U.S. 485, 501 n.17 (1984)).
24. Id. (citing Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352 (1991) (plurality opinion) (consid-
ering whether a state court's finding on the question of discriminatory intent regarding
peremptory strikes of jurors is subject to "independent appellate review")).
25. Id.
26. Bose, 466 U.S. at 501 n.17.
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A finding of fact in some cases is inseparable from the
principles through which it was deduced. At some point, the
reasoning by which a fact is "found" crosses the line between
application of those ordinary principles of logic and com-
mon experience which are ordinarily entrusted to the finder
of fact into the realm of a legal rule upon which the review-
ing court must exercise its own independent judgment. 7
The paragraph of text to which footnote 17 is appended discusses
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) 28 and makes the point that the
rule's prescription of a deferential standard (not "clearly erroneous")
for appellate review of a federal trial court's findings of fact
including those described as "ultimate facts" because they
may determine the outcome of litigation ... does not inhibit
an appellate court's power to correct errors of law, including
those that may infect a so-called mixed finding of law and
fact, or a finding of fact that is predicated on a misunder-
standing of the governing rule of law.29
The cases cited in the text to which note 17 was appended are Pull-
man-Standard v. Swint,3° and Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories,
Inc.31 Among cases cited two pages earlier is NAACP v. Claiborne Hard-
ware Co.,32 in which members of a civil rights group defended against
claims of tort liability for an alleged conspiracy to boycott, and the
Court invoked the Sullivan independent review standard. 33
The opinion of the Court in Bose, delivered by Justice Stevens,
concludes:
We hold that the clearly-erroneous standard of Rule 52 (a) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure does not prescribe the
standard of review to be applied in reviewing a determina-
tion of actual malice in a case governed by New York Times Co.
v. Sullivan. Appellate judges in such a case must exercise in-
27. Id.
28. Rule 52(a) provides in pertinent part, "Findings of fact.., shall not be set aside
unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court
to judge of the credibility of the wimesses." FED. R Civ. P. 52(a).
29. Bose, 466 U.S. at 501.
30. 456 U.S 273, 287-88 (1982) ("Rule 52(a) does not furnish particular guidance with
respect to distinguishing law from fact.").
31. 456 U.S. 844, 858 (1982) (reversing an appellate court's rejection of a "finding"
supported by evidence).
32. 458 U.S. 886, 934 (1982) (reversing state court's imposition of liability because
state court's factual findings were "constitutionally insufficient to support the judgment").
33. Id. at 915-16 n.50 (stating that the Court must make an "independent examination
of the whole record") (citation omitted).
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dependent judgment and determine whether the record estab-
lishes actual malice with convincing clarity.3
4
The two dissenting opinions in Bose by Justice White 5 and [now
Chief] Justice Rehnquist, with whom Justice O'Connor joined, 6
agreed that the actual knowledge component of "actual malice" is one
of historical fact-a finding that is to be reviewed under the Rule
52(a) standard rather than by an "independent judgment" or "de
novo" standard. The dissenters pointed out, however, that previous
decisions of the Court in other contexts had approved independent
appellate review of facts underlying constitutional claims when a con-
clusion of law as to a federal right and a finding of fact are "so inter-
mingled" as to make independent review essential to a correct
determination of the constitutional issue. 37 In a footnote to his dis-
sent,38 Justice Rehnquist noted that issues distinguished from the "ac-
tual malice" issue in defamation include obscenity and child
pornography cases,39 and cases of words inciting to anger or vio-
lence.4" These cases, in the view of Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor,
"more clearly involve the kind of mixed questions of fact and law
which call for de novo appellate review than do the New York Times
'actual malice' cases, which simply involve questions of pure historical
fact."41
Another significant opinion bearing on the meaning and applica-
bility of "independent" review was released on November 25, 1995, in
Thompson v. Keohane.4 2 Here, too, a petitioner serving a sentence
under a state conviction was seeking habeas relief under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(d). During a two-hour, tape-recorded session at the Alaska
state trooper headquarters, he had confessed to killing his former
wife. He contended that the troopers obtained his confession without
giving Miranda warnings.43 The federal district court denied the peti-
tion,4A and the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.43
34. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 514 (1984)
(footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
35. Id. at 515 (White, J., dissenting).
36. Id. (Rehnquist,J., dissenting).
37. Id. at 517.
38. Id. at 517-18 n.1.
39. Id. (citing New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 774 n.28 (1982); Miller v. California,
413 U.S. 15 (1983); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957)).
40. Id. (citing Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105 (1973) (per curiam); Street v. New York,
394 U.S. 576 (1969); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942)).
41. Id.
42. 116 S. CL 457 (1995).
43. Id. at 460.
44. Thompson v. Keohane, No. CV-91-00171-JWS (D. Ark. Dec. 8, 1993).
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Both federal courts held that the state court's ruling that he was not
"in custody" for Miranda purposes was a "fact" determination as to
which section 2254(d) establishes a presumption of correctness.46
Justice Ginsburg, delivering the opinion of the Court, held that
state court "in custody" rulings, made to determine whether Miranda
warnings are due, do not qualify for a presumption of correctness
under section 2254(d). Citing Miller v. Fenton,48 the opinion ac-
knowledges "that the Court has not charted an entirely clear course"
in distinguishing between law and fact in the area of "mixed determi-
nations '49 and, after declaring that "[t]wo lines of decisions compose
the Court's § 2254(d) law/factjurisprudence,"5 ° continues:
In several cases, the Court has classified as "factual is-
sues" within section 2254(d)'s compass questions extending
beyond the determination of "what happened." This cate-
gory notably includes: competency to stand trial; and juror
impartiality. While these issues encompass more than "basic,
primary, or historical facts," their resolution depends heavily
on the trial court's appraisal of witness credibility and de-
meanor. (Although the trial court is "applying some kind of
legal standard to what [it] sees and hears," its "predominate
function in determining juror bias involves credibility find-
ings whose basis cannot be easily discerned from an appel-
late record."). This Court has reasoned that a trial court is
better positioned to make decisions of this genre, and has
therefore accorded the judgment of the jurist-observer "pre-
sumptive weight."
On the other hand, the Court has ranked as issues of law
for section 2254(d) purposes: the voluntariness of a confes-
sion; the effectiveness of counsel's assistance; and the poten-
tial conflict of interest arising out of an attorney's
representation of multiple defendants. "What happened" is-
sues in these cases warranted a presumption of correctness,
but the Court declared "the ultimate question" outside sec-
tion 2254(d)'s domain because of its "uniquely legal
dimension."51
In a summarizing paragraph, Justice Ginsburg declared:
45. Thompson v. Keohane, No. 94-35052, 1994 WL 424289, at *1 (9th Cir. Aug. 11,
1994).
46. Thompson, 116 S. Ct. at 462.
47. Id. at 460.
48. 474 U.S. 104 (1985).
49. Thompson, 116 S. Ct. at 464 (quoting Miller, 474 U.S. at 113).
50. Id.
51. Id. at 464-65 (internal citations omitted) (alteration in original).
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Classifying "in custody" as a determination qualifying for in-
dependent review should serve legitimate law enforcement
interests as effectively as it serves to insure protection of the
right against self-incrimination. As our decisions bear out,
the law declaration aspect of independent review potentially
may guide police, unify precedent, and stabilize the law.5
The only other opinion handed down in Thompson v. Keohane was that
of Justice Thomas, joined by the Chief Justice, dissenting. The dis-
sent, however, differs only about what result should be reached by in-
dependent determination and does not challenge the independent
determination principle.
Indeed, the dissent states: "Because the Miranda custody issue
'falls somewhere between a pristine legal standard and a simple histor-
ical fact,' we must decide, 'as a matter of the sound administration of
justice, [which] judicial actor is better positioned . . . to decide the
issue in question. ' " "
In summary, the Court's evolving practice of exercising "its own
independent judgment" or "review" or "determination" is connected
with pervasive principles, first, of federalism, second, of allocation of
functions between judge and jury, and, third, of allocation of func-
tions between trial and appellate courts. With respect to allocation of
functions between judge and jury, we also must account for remnants
of the influence of the distinction between law and equity.5 The im-
plications of the Court's practice of independent determination are
matters of great potential significance in the legal system generally
and in tort litigation particularly.
B. What, Exactly, Is the Meaning of an "Independent Judgnent,"
"Review," or "Determination"?
In Bose, as noted above, all nine justices then serving on the Court
approved independent appellate review of facts underlying constitu-
tional claims in certain types of cases-those in which conclusions of
law as to a federal right and one or more findings of fact are so inter-
mingled as to make independent review essential to a correct determi-
nation of the constitutional issue. 6 Is it significant that at least some
52. Id at 467 (citations omitted).
53. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
54. Id. at 468 (quoting Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 114 (1985) (alterations in
original)).
55. See also Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 1384 (1996) (invoking
historical equity jurisprudence as a relevant consideration in determining whether patent
"claim" interpretation is to be left to the jury).
56. See supra text accompanying notes 34-41.
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of the dissenting Justices did not sign on to the terminology of "in-
dependent judgment?
As the Court works out other implications of this evolving con-
cept, the phrases "independent review" and "closer scrutiny," as ap-
plied to findings of fact of a jury or judge in a trial court, may be less
supportive than the phrase "independent judgment" for taking an is-
sue away from the jury or trial judge and treating it at all levels of
litigation as an issue to be decided as matters of law are decided.
Reaching an independent judgment may connote substituting the
Court's judgment for that of the finder of facts and ending the litiga-
tion on that basis, rather than just determining that the finding must
be set aside and a new trial granted, unless the Court also concludes
that, "as a matter of law," the record simply will not support the find-
ing that was made.
More recently, federal circuit courts as well as the Supreme Court
have extended the practice of independent determination by higher
federal courts about "factual conclusions" reached in a federal trial
court, or elsewhere in the earlier history of a controversy destined for
decision in a federal trial court, and on appeal in a higher court.
Some illustrations involve constitutional challenges to the validity of
actions by officials of legislative or executive branches of the national
government or a state government. An example is Wilson v. Arkan-
sas,57 adopting the "knock-and-announce" principle of common law as
"an element of the reasonableness inquiry under the Fourth
Amendment."s5
Another example is New Hampshire Motor Transport Ass'n v. Town of
Plaistow.59 That case concerned a dormant Commerce Clause chal-
lenge to a town's curfew on noisy, foul-smelling trucking of hazardous
waste over residential streets between 9:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m. The
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the district court's re-
jection of the challenge, explaining: "[A]bsent discrimination, courts
may reasonably insist on a fairly clear showing of undue burden
before holding unconstitutional a traditional example of local regula-
tion.'6° The Court of Appeals also stated: "Even if we reviewed this
[district court's] fact-specific legal determination de novo, our conclu-
sion would be the same." 61 The court cites to note 17 in Bose,62 sug-
57. 115 U.S. 1914 (1995).
58. Id. at 1918.
59. 67 F.3d 326 (1st Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 64 U.S.L.W. 3519 (U.S. Apr. 1, 1996).
60. Id. at 333.
61. Id. at 332-33 (citing Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S.
485, 501 n.17 (1984)).
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gesting the possibility of invoking the "independent judgment"
principle of review in this dormant Commerce Clause context. An-
other context was added to the growing list of illustrations in Ornelas
v. United States.63
Will future decisions continue to refine the distinction between
(1) the Court's holding that the Court itself (and, of course, lower
courts as well) must exercise "independent judgment" over an issue
rather than reviewing deferentially a purported factual finding by a
jury because the factual issue is too tightly interwoven with a legal is-
sue material to a constitutional challenge to be left to a jury, and (2)
the Court's exercising independent review only to ensure that juries
(and trial judges as finders of fact) have not erred in applying the law?
Absent further refinement of the distinction, trial judges and trial ad-
vocates may face even greater difficulty in crafting instructions to a
jury with sufficient clarity that the formal presumption that jurors
have faithfully followed the court's instructions on the law in reaching
their verdict is consistent with realistic expectations.
III. Is THERE AN ORGANIZING PRINCIPLE?
A. Why Search for an Organizing Principle?
Generalizations about law that spring from observations of similar
developments in varied types of litigation may be quite valuable aids
to decision-makers. This is especially true if they are successfully used
in deciding particular controversies-that is, they serve as aids to mak-
ing informed choices on candidly explained grounds.
If the effort to identify an organizing principle succeeds, we will
be better prepared to decide the hard cases that fall so close to the
line of distinction implicit in any statement of principle that choice is
difficult.
Is there an underlying principle (that goes beyond even the sever-
est form of independent review) by which a reviewing court deter-
mines when it will, or should, invoke the independent judgment
62. Id.
63. Ornelas v. United States, No. 95-5257, 1996 WL 276414, at *1-2 (U.S. May 28, 1996)
(holding that the Court of Appeals must review de novo trial court's determinations of
ultimate questions of reasonable suspicision to stop and probable cause to make warrant-
less search of automobile); see also Whren v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 1775-76 (1996)
(finding that temporary detention of motorist upon probable cause to believe that a traffic
violation had occurred did not violate Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasona-
ble seizure, even if a finder of facts might decide that a reasonable officer would not have
made the stop absent other law enforcement objectives).
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practice? Or are the illustrations from varied contexts no more than
disconnected examples of ad hoc decisions?
B. A Provisional Principle
One possible way of framing a provisional organizing principle is
the following:
Law sometimes assigns to a finder of facts (jury or judge in a non-
jury trial) and at other times assigns to courts (to be decided as mat-
ters of law are decided) the function of drawing from historical facts
(either historical facts that are undisputed or historical facts as found
by a finder of facts on disputed evidence) an evaluative inference that
what happened satisfied a legal test upon which the outcome de-
pends. This function is assigned to a court, not to a jury (or a trial
judge as finder of fact), when the court determines that (1) the court
is significantly better positioned than a finder of fact to decide the
combined legal-factual issue, (2) risks of misapplication of the con-
trolling law by a finder of fact are substantial, and (3) the legal protec-
tion for the interest at risk is constitutional.
Another possibility to be considered is whether the practice may
extend beyond issues of constitutional dimension, to other compel-
ling interests that are highly valued in the legal system. That is,
should element (3) of the foregoing statement of the principle be
expanded beyond constitutional protection for some interests that are
highly valued in the legal system?
IV. NEW COMPLEXITIES IN THE LAW OF DEFAMATION
A. The Seamless Web and Other Metaphors
A defamation case may present a host of questions, unanswered
by precedent, about how the trial court and the reviewing court are to
deal with thoroughly intermingled legal-factual elements of an issue.
One point has been settled by the Supreme Court in New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan"' and its progeny, including Bose.65 A reviewing court
(including the Supreme Court), before allowing a defamation claim
to survive a motion for summary judgment or for judgment as a mat-
ter of law, may-and perhaps at the Court of Appeals level, where the
only assured review of the trial court's judgment occurs, must-inde-
pendently examine the record with special care. The purpose of the
special rule is to assure that either before or after the case is submitted
64. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
65. 466 U.S. 485 (1984).
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to a finder of facts, but in any event before ajudgment becomes final,
a court determines whether the finding can be or has been properly
made on evidence sufficient to support the finding. In performing
that function the trial court (and, if there is an appeal, the reviewing
court) must, (1) correctly understand all of the relevant substantive
law that identifies which facts must be found to support a claim or
defense, (2) correctly understand the special rules about burdens of
production and persuasion (including who has each burden and, as to
a burden of persuasion, whether it is "by a preponderance of the evi-
dence" or instead invokes some more demanding standard, such as
"by clear and convincing evidence"), (3) correctly apply (when exam-
ining the record to determine whether it presents some genuine dis-
pute of material fact) both the substantive law rules and the rules
regarding burdens, and (4) determine, as nearly as possible, whether
the finder of facts correctly understood and applied both the substan-
tive law and the special rules about burdens referred to in the first
three requirements.
In some defamation cases, additional problems make the task of
the trial judge and the task of the appellate court, on review, even
more difficult. The two problems stated immediately below are
illustrations.
First, the meaning of "genuine dispute" varies with context. As
this phrase is used in relation to motions for summary judgment or
for judgment as a matter of law during trial, its precise meaning de-
pends on whether the burden of persuasion is "by a preponderance of
the evidence" or instead "by clear and convincing evidence." Indeed,
the problem of variable meaning of "genuine dispute," in the sense of
something that goes to the jury, is further complicated by the fact that
one might reasonably view the clear and convincing evidence stan-
dard as, at least in the first instance, a directive to the court about
examining its own state of mind when deciding whether to let an issue
go to the jury, rather than a directive to the court about instructions it
should give to the jury about the degree to which the jury is satisfied
about the truth of some disputed factual assertion.66
Second, the substantive constitutional law standard varies with
context. The Supreme Court has determined the substantive law
rules for a few, but only a few, of the many possible sets of relevant
factual variables in defamation cases. It has laid out a fairly detailed
66. CompareJustice Breyer's explanation of the "harmless error" standard in O'Neal v.
McAninch, 115 S. Ct. 992, 994 (1995) (concluding that when a reviewingjudge in a habeas
corpus case is in "grave doubt" about whether a trial error affected the verdict, it should
not be treated as "harmless error").
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and specific set of rules for an alleged defamatory statement (a) by a
media-type declarant, (b) about a public official, or (c) on a subject
matter of public concern.6 7 It has yet to hold, or even say for a clear
majority of the Court, much about an alleged defamatory statement
(a) by a private speaker, (b) about a private person (that is, one who is
neither a public official nor a public figure), or (c) on a subject mat-
ter that is private (that is, not a matter of public concern, not a matter
bearing upon legally recognized interests of some identifiable group,
and not even a matter within the scope of a legally recognized
"interest") .68
Rather than resorting to the traditional metaphor of law as a two-
dimensional, or even three-dimensional, seamless web, think of the
law of defamation as a cube of cubes composed of the twenty-seven
separate cubic boxes labeled to represent the twenty-seven possible
combinations of the three variables (regarding the type of defendant-
declarant, the type of plaintiff, and the type of subject matter). In
each small cubic box stacked together to form the larger cube is a set
of legal rules to be applied to a fact situation having the set of vari-
ables for that position in the larger cube. Around the diagonal be-
tween two opposite corners of the cube of cubes, most favorable
respectively to liability and nonliability, are twenty-five more cubic
boxes, most of which are empty or nearly so, because the precise set of
variables each box represents has not yet been before the Court, and
the inferences we draw about the rules that will apply are merely
that-inferences, informed by analogy, rather than firm precedents.
Think, for example, about the box concerned with a defamatory
statement by a private person, about a person drawn into public view
by a tragic coincidence, as in Brown v. Hearst Corp.6 9 The plaintiff in
that case was a husband and father whose wife, an airline flight attend-
ant, disappeared under circumstances that remain to some extent a
mystery.7° By coincidence, another woman in the same small commu-
nity, also an airline flight attendant, had disappeared less than a year
earlier, and her husband had been convicted of murder in connection
with the disappearance, and had, of course, been the subject of exten-
sive media reports. 71 After the second disappearance, a custody dis-
67. See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964).
68. One may wonder whether an "interest" still might be legally recognized even if it is
no more than curiosity, as benign as curiosity can ever be in knowing salacious facts about
one's neighbors.
69. 54 F.3d 21 (1st Cir. 1995), affg 862 F. Supp. 622 (D. Mass. 1994).
70. Id. at 23.
71. Id.
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pute arose over a child and led to bitter court proceedings that were
the subject of media reports."2 Police investigation of the second dis-
appearance occurred, but no criminal proceedings were initiated. 73
Months after media reports regarding the second disappearance and
the custody dispute had ceased, a television program aired by the de-
fendant corporation's station brought together in one program these
separate incidents, drew some comparisons, and raised questions
about the still-undetermined circumstances of the second disappear-
ance.74 The plaintiff sued for defamation, alleging that the television
program carried the defamatory innuendo, among others, that he was
a murderer. 75
In such a case, who decides, and how does one decide, which of
the twenty-seven boxes is the right box for this case (for example, is
this or is this not a statement about a "public figure" on a matter of
"public concern"?), and what are the rules of decision in that box?
B. "Opinion" and Associated Complexities
As defamation cases sometimes dramatically illustrate, the rele-
vant variables extend beyond and become more complex than just the
three sets identified above in the metaphor of a seamless web and the
three-dimensional metaphor of a cube of cubes. A proposed distinc-
tion between statements of fact and statements of opinion adds com-
plexity not addressed by either of the metaphors just discussed.
Is it significant, for determining the scope of the constitutional
limitations upon liability for allegedly defamatory declarations,
whether an objectively reasonable interpreter of the declaration
would not understand the defamatory sting to be asserted as fact, but
at most as an opinion? Is it significant whether a reasonable inter-
preter of the communication would understand it as not only stating
an opinion but also disclosing the basis for that opinion?
One may read Chief District Judge Tauro's opinion in Brown v.
Hearst Corp.,7' as having been influenced considerably by the distinc-
tion between making an implicit assertion of fact ("he is a murderer")
and reporting undisputed facts, including those about an extensive
investigation in which the plaintiff figured but was never charged, and
then expressing or implying an opinion about the likelihood that
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 23-24.
75. Id. at 24.
76. 862 F. Supp. 622, 632 (D. Mass. 1994) (holding broadcast report not actionable),
affd 54 F.3d 21 (1st Cir. 1995).
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plaintiff in fact did the act.7 7 As long as the opinion is based on the
reported facts-and the communication does not suggest in any way
that the declarant knows anything more that is material to one's form-
ing one's own opinion-is it protected expression?
Justice Powell's opinion for the Court in Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc.,"8 made the sweeping assertion that "[u]nder the First Amend-
ment there is no such thing as a false idea."79 The Court has pulled
back from that broad assertion, but the precedents have not fore-
closed the argument that something is left of the constitutional pro-
tection for a speaker's expressions of opinion as distinguished from
the speaker's assertions of fact.80
Also, as another aspect of Brown v. Hearst Corp. illustrates, prece-
dents have not foreclosed some limited protection for reporting a
court proceeding-in Brown, a child custody proceeding.81 Does the
circumstance that a television program included statements about a
custody proceeding of some time past invoke principles and policy
questions like those underlying the common-law privilege of a fair re-
port, even if not satisfying, as a matter of law, the precise elements of a
fair report? Would it be significant that a departure, if any, from a fair
report, or from the theme of a fair report, was only, or at least princi-
pally, in that a defamatory sting (for example, an innuendo that plain-
tiff committed a specific crime) might be suggested to the mind of the
reasonable interpreter of the program as a whole, but not as the
meaning the creators of the program intended? Questions such as
these illustrate that the law of defamation is now even more complex
than is captured in the metaphor of many unfilled boxes in a cube of
cubes.
V. PROFESSOR GRAY'S INSIGHTS
The 1986 edition of Harper and James,"2 revised by Professor Os-
car Gray, presents a remarkably crisp and informative statement of a
final point to which I now turn. "The tort of defamation has under-
gone revolutionary changes in the United States since 1964, as a result
of developments in constitutional law. Those changes, and the result-
ing state of defamation law, can best be understood against the back-
77. Id. at 628-29.
78. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
79. Id. at 339.
80. See, e.g., Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 19-21 (1990) (declining to
create a separate constitutional protection for "opinion").
81. Brown, 862 F. Supp. at 626.
82. FOWLER V. HARPER ET At., THE LAW OF ToRTS (2d ed. 1986 & Supp. 1 1995).
1360 [VOL. 55:1344
LAW AND FACT IN TORT LITIGATION
ground of the earlier common law doctrine." 3 Professor Gray then
continues with a brief overview that brings together circumstances
supporting some central observations about the history of what we
know today as the law of defamation.
At common law the defamation actions, libel and slan-
der, were strict liability torts.... Absent truth or privilege, the actor
was subject to liability without regard to his fault or lack of fault.
Plaintiff might prove damages, but need not do so. The trier
of fact was permitted to find "presumed" damages. Punitive
damages could also be awarded, on criteria that varied
among the states. Typically something in the way of "malice"
was required, but this might mean any number of things,
e.g., spite, ill will, or wrongful purpose. Liability was on the
whole predicated on false statements of fact. There could
also be liability, however, for defamatory statements of opin-
ion that fell outside a zone of privilege permitted by the doc-
trine of "fair comment." Within that zone of privilege a
considerable degree of vilification was permitted for certain
objectives deemed worthy of protection, e.g., literary and
dramatic criticism, and political discussion.
This scheme of legal relationships between defamers and the de-
famed worked reasonably satisfactorily, on the whole, until the
1960s, despite a few strange theoretical anomalies, and occa-
sional apparent injustices ....
In the 1960s, however, a constitutional crisis developed in con-
nection with the reporting of events related to the civil rights move-
ment .... 84
Before New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 5 there was no general news-
worthiness privilege. If the media-type declarant failed to satisfy the
elements of "fair comment" as developed in the applicable state law,
liability was strict. No proof of fault of any kind was required (beyond,
of course, such fault as one might perceive in the declarant's not satis-
fying the elements of the privilege of fair comment).
The outcomes of defamation cases in both state and federal
courts have been materially different since 1964 because of Sullivan.
Of potentially greater long-term significance, however, is the fact that
tort law more generally has been deeply influenced by developments
in the law during the thirty years since the Sullivan decision. We ordi-
narily think of these developments as part of the law of defamation,
83. Id. § 5.0 at 2.
84. Id. at 3-5 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
85. 376 U.S, 254 (1964).
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but in fact they extend to application of the First Amendment in con-
texts other than defamation and to practices with respect to "in-
dependent" court determination of legal-factual issues of potentially
more pervasive influence in tort law more generally.
These influences will continue, and so will the benefit of Profes-
sor Gray's lucid exposition of their historical foundations in the law of
defamation.
